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ABSTRACT
Clinical trial data generated during the FDA drug approval
process can be very valuable. While patients and doctors
desperately need this information to make informed choices about
medical treatment, drug sponsors strive to keep this resource secret
to ensure their ability to profit from their own research. In the
wake of the controversy over antidepressant use in children, both
the public and Congress have called for the disclosure of all
clinical trial data. However, rather than taking an all-or-nothing
approach that could harm the development of new drugs, this iBrief
argues that Congress should address the issue of trial data
disclosure by restoring the proper balance to Exemption 4 of the
Freedom of Information Act.

INTRODUCTION
Matt Miller was unhappy.2 Having moved to a new neighborhood
and a new school, Matt was thrust into unknown territory without his
support system of old friends with whom he had grown up.3 That summer,
Matt was prescribed Zoloft, an antidepressant, and was told to call his
doctor in a week.4 On a Sunday night, after taking his seventh pill, Matt
went to his bedroom closet, where there was a hook just a little higher than
he was tall.5 Matt hung himself, having to lift his legs off the floor and hold
himself there until he passed out.6 He was only thirteen years old.7
¶1
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This was but one of many sad stories that were heard at the
February 2004 meeting of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
Psychopharmacologic Advisory Committee and the Pediatric Subcommittee
of the Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Committee. The meeting was
convened to review reports of suicidal thoughts and behavior in children
being treated for depression with antidepressants.8 Suicide is the third
leading cause of death for adolescents, exceeded only by homicide and
accidents.9 While only one antidepressant, Prozac, has been approved by
the FDA for use in this age group, physicians are free to prescribe other
antidepressants to young patients if they feel it would be the best course of
treatment.10
¶2

¶3
The problem facing physicians and patients with regard to such
prescriptions is a lack of information about the effect of antidepressants on
adolescents. Physicians and patients need information on the risks and
benefits of a drug to make an informed decision about whether it is worth
taking in light of other treatment alternatives.11 Clinical trial data can be a
powerful source of this information as in the case of antidepressant pediatric
trial data which, although they suggested a link between suicide and
antidepressant use, were withheld from public view by both drug companies
and the FDA.12 Thus, public disclosure of all trial data, as was recently
proposed by Representatives Markey and Waxman, seems to be a logical
solution.13
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Unfortunately, solutions to problems involving the drug industry
are rarely so logical or simple. An all-or-nothing approach to disclosure
could have serious implications for drug sponsors who have invested vast
amounts of money and time in the high-risk drug development process.
Disclosing clinical trial data to competitors would eat away at any
advantage such data conferred, reducing profits and the incentive to engage
in the drug development process itself.14 The flow of new drugs to the
market would thereby be reduced, much to the detriment of the health and
welfare of society.
¶4

¶5
In light of the complexities presented by the disclosure of clinical
trial data, this iBrief argues that an all-or-nothing approach to disclosure is
not the correct course of action. Rather, Congress should revise Exemption
4 of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),15 which provides a
mechanism for disclosure of clinical trial data but has been debilitated due
to unrestrained judicial interpretation. By restoring the balance between
public and private interests in disclosure that Exemption 4 was meant to
incorporate, both the interests of medicine and those of the drug industry
can be taken into account.

I. CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: HURTLING TOWARDS DISCLOSURE
¶6
Prior to introducing a drug to the market, drug sponsors must prove
with substantial evidence that their drugs are not only generally safe but
also “effective for their intended uses.”16 Under the “substantial evidence”
requirement, the FDA can tailor clinical trials so as to generate the type of
data necessary to satisfy its regulations.17 This determination is based upon
animal studies and other preliminary data submitted in a drug sponsor’s
request for an investigational new drug application (“IND”).18 If the FDA
grants the IND, the drug sponsor can begin human trials.19 These trials
occur in three distinct phases, with Phase I generating general safety data,
Phase II generating general efficacy data, and Phase III generating data on
the overall positive and negative effects of the drug.20 The results of these
trials are submitted to the FDA in the drug sponsor’s new drug application

14
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HARV. L. REV. 837, 849 (1980).
15
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(“NDA”), which, if approved, allows the drug to be marketed to consumers
for its intended uses.21

A. The Secrecy of Clinical Trial Data: Pros and Cons of Disclosure
¶7
Public disclosure of clinical trial data generated during the FDA
drug approval process poses the problem of free-riding.22 In the absence of
protection, competitors of drug sponsors can take advantage of the
information conveyed in clinical trials without having dedicated the vast
amount of resources required to generate it.23 Such free-riding on the
investment of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that sponsor
drugs can inhibit the ability of these companies to profit from their own
research, thereby stripping away the incentives to engage in drug
development itself.24
¶8
The threat of free-riding, however, is particularly serious for drug
development given that it is an inherently high-risk process.25 Current
estimates of the costs of new drug development range from $400 million26
to over $800 million dollars.27 Much of the increase in these costs from
previous estimates is attributable to escalating clinical trial costs28 which
constitute approximately 70% of total expenditures during the development
process.29 These monumental costs accumulate over the estimated ten to
fifteen years required to gain FDA approval.30 The risk involved in

21

James T. O’Reilly, Knowledge Is Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry
Trade Secrets, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985).
22
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Confidentiality of Business Secrets in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53
FOOD DRUG L.J. 123, 123 (1998).
23
McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 849.
24
See id.
25
Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy and Availability: Patents
and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology
Industries, 8 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 7, 19 (2003).
26
Id. at 9; John F. Niblack, Drug Development: Who Knows Where The Time
Goes?: Why Are Drug Development Programs Growing in Size and Cost? A
View from Industry, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 151, 151 (1997).
27
Grabowski, supra note 25, at 10; Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development, News Release: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million [hereinafter News
Release], at http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=6 (Nov.
30, 2001).
28
News Release, supra note 27.
29
Grabowski, supra note 25, at 9.
30
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Backgrounder: How New
Drugs Move through the Development and Approval Process, at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=4 (Nov. 1, 2001).
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dedicating such vast sums of money over such a long period of time is
compounded by the uncertainties of the approval process itself.31 It has
been estimated that only five in every five thousand potential
pharmaceutical agents reach the clinical trial phase, and only one of those
five will ever make it to the hands of consumers.32 Furthermore, few FDAapproved drugs actually generate sufficient revenues to recoup the costs of
research and development, which is essential to a drug sponsor’s long-term
success.33 These factors contribute to the high-risk nature of drug
development,34 and, in this environment, information that can reduce costs
or increase the probability of FDA approval is immensely valuable and
greatly coveted by the companies that have access to it.
¶9
Clinical trials represent a significant source of such information.
Trial protocols can present methods of providing sufficient data to satisfy
FDA requirements with the least amount of time and investment involved.35
Trial results can identify new avenues of research or confirm that such
research leads only to a dead end.36 As such, drug developers have sought
to protect clinical trial data from disclosure to their competitors.
¶10
The zealous protection of clinical trial data, however, has come at
the cost of hindering the public’s ability to make informed choices about
medical treatment.37 Information forms the core of an individual’s decision
to take a new drug.38 Because of the rigorous showing of safety and
effectiveness required by the FDA regulatory scheme, clinical trials
performed during the drug approval process represent the single greatest
source of information concerning the risks and benefits for any given
prescription drug.39 Phase I trials, performed on healthy volunteers,
produce evidence of “toxicity, dosage range, metabolism, absorption,
bioavailability, and elimination.”40 Phase II trials, performed on patients
with the particular disease the drug is designed to treat, produce evidence of

31

See id.
Id.
33
Grabowski, supra note 25, at 17.
34
News Release, supra note 27.
35
See id.
36
See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 850.
37
See id. at 844-45 (arguing that consumers should have access to health and
safety data so that they can balance the risks and benefits unique to them).
38
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 670.
39
See id. at 672-73 (describing the FDA-approval process as “a device for
generating a special kind of information about new drugs”); see Weeks, supra
note 16, at 659 (describing the FDA-approval process as an “exhaustive review
of the product and its indications” requiring “a high quantum of proof of safety
and efficacy” prior to approval).
40
Weeks, supra note 16, at 655.
32
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“efficiency, side effects, and risks.” 41 While Phase I and II trials are
performed on only a small number of patients, Phase III trials involve large
numbers of individuals affected with the disease and generate evidence of
“the overall benefits and risks of the drug.”42 By denying access to these
data, the formation and execution of rational decisions by patients and their
physicians are impeded, thereby jeopardizing the health and well-being of
patients and society as a whole.43

B. Public Clamor for Disclosure: The Problems of Off-Label Use
Hindering the public’s ability to make informed medical choices is
most costly when a drug is put to an off-label use. Off-label use “occurs
when the drug is employed in a manner not described in the product’s FDAapproved labeling” and “include[s] administration at a new dosage, through
a new route (e.g., oral, intravenous, or intradermal), to a new patient
population or, most controversially, for a new indication.”44 Off-label use is
extremely common, accounting for up to 40-60% of all drug prescriptions
and upwards of 80-90% of all prescriptions in children and individuals
suffering from rare diseases.45 Off-label use is so well established in the
medical field that, “in some cases, failure to prescribe a drug for an off-label
use would be the basis for a malpractice action.”46 Indeed, prescribing
drugs in ways not contemplated on their labels has had some very notable
success.47 For example, Viagra was initially only approved for chest pain
but later proved to be a successful treatment for erectile dysfunction.48
Similarly, the use of aspirin to prevent heart attacks was only approved by
the FDA in 1998.49
¶11

¶12
However, off-label uses pose substantial danger to patients because
of the absence of reliable information from which informed decisions can
be made.50 The FDA does not regulate either the practice of medicine or the
41

Id.
Id.
43
See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 671-72.
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Shane M. Ward, WLF and the Two-Click Rule: The First Amendment Inequity
of the Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Use
Information on the Internet, 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 41, 41 (2001).
45
Id. at 45.
46
Id. at 46.
47
See James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber
and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANN.
HEALTH L. 295, 298 (2003).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDAApproved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA.
L. REV. 181, 202 (1999).
42
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off-label use of drugs, and it has consistently held to its policy that “[o]nce a
product has been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for
uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in
approved labeling.”51 The consequence of this hands-off policy is that offlabel uses are not subject to the rigorous scrutiny of the FDA’s safety and
efficacy regulations and “therefore also lack the consumer safeguarding we
usually associate with prescription drugs.”52 While patients and physicians
can rely on information contained on drug labels to make informed choices
about on-label use, they are forced to “rely on anecdotal information from
colleagues or on information contained in scientific journals” to make such
choices about off-label use.53 This dramatically increases the danger that
“physicians and consumers will be misled into relying on scientific logic or
scanty data supporting a particular use, without adequate well-controlled
clinical trials that prove definitively that the drug works.”54 A tragic
example of this is the fen-phen disaster involving the off-label combination
of fenfluramine and phentermine, which caused an estimated 285,000 users
to develop serious heart complications.55
¶13
The danger posed by this dearth of information has become clear
from the recent revelation that both drug makers and the FDA have
withheld trial data suggesting that antidepressants are no more effective
than placebo and increase the risk of suicidal behavior in depressed
children.56 Anecdotal evidence of the link between antidepressants and
suicidal tendencies in children has circulated the medical field “for a very
long time”57 but such rumors have been largely dismissed by drug makers
and the FDA.58 However, during its review of the data submitted for the
antidepressant Paxil in the spring of 2003, the FDA discovered that “events
suggestive of suicidality” in pediatric trials appeared to have been collected
under a more general term of “emotional liability.”59 While British
regulators, in response to disclosures made by several drug sponsors of
antidepressants, reacted strongly by prohibiting the use of all but one

51

James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 71, 76-78
(1998).
52
Salbu, supra note 50, at 202.
53
Weeks, supra note 16, at 648.
54
Salbu, supra note 50, at 202 (quoting Nancy K. Plant, Prescription Drug
Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the Inquisitive or Trap for the Unwary?, 42
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 89, 129 (1998)).
55
Id. at 202-03.
56
See Harris, supra note 9; Mondics, supra note 10.
57
Transcript, supra note 2, at 231.
58
Harris, supra note 9.
59
Transcript, supra note 2, at 235-236.
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antidepressant in children by the end of 2003,60 the FDA suppressed the
initial findings of its analysts61 and discouraged the efforts of several drug
sponsors to add stronger label warnings about their products’ use in
children.62 Public outcry for disclosure of all clinical trial data ensued,
leading to a legislative proposal that would “require researchers to register
their clinical trials in a federal registry before starting them and report the
results of those trials at the conclusion.”63

C. A Better Solution
Such an all-or-nothing approach to the disclosure of clinical trial
data, however, fails to recognize that there are valid arguments both for and
against disclosure. Requiring disclosure of data without regard to the
potential competitive harm that could be inflicted upon drug sponsors could
diminish the number of companies willing to risk the time and effort
required to bring drugs to market, thereby diminishing the health and
welfare of society. The controversy surrounding disclosure requires a more
nuanced approach that takes account of the arguments for and against
disclosure. Such an approach could be achieved by rejecting the judicially
imposed limitations on Exemption 4 of the FOIA and restoring the balance
between the public’s interest in disclosure and private interests in
confidentiality.
¶14

II. THE BALANCE OF EXEMPTION 4 OF THE FOIA
Enacted in 1966, the FOIA64 was meant as a tool for all Americans
to “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to
the light of public scrutiny.”65 To achieve this, the FOIA requires “federal
government agencies to disclose ‘agency records’ upon request to ‘any
person’ requesting those records.” 66 It was hoped that, by providing access
to agency records, the FOIA would “ensure an informed citizenry, vital to
the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption
¶15

60

Mondics, supra note 10.
Harris, supra note 9.
62
Shankar Vedantam, FDA Urged Withholding Data on Antidepressants;
Makers Were Dissuaded from Labeling Drugs as Ineffective in Children, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at A2.
63
130 Cong. Rec. E1882, 1883 (October 11, 2004) (remarks of Rep. Markey).
For more information on the proposed legislation see footnote 13.
64
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
65
Anderson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir.
1990)(quoting Wren v. Harris, 675 F.2d 1144, 1145 (10th Cir. 1982)(quoting
Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976))).
66
Sean E. Andrussier, Note, The Freedom of Information Act in 1990: More
Freedom for the Government; Less Information for the Public, 1991 DUKE L.J.
753, 753 (1991).
61
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and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” 67 Under the FOIA,
“the presumption in favor of disclosure is at its zenith,”68 and courts must
construe its terms broadly in favor of disclosure.69 The FDA falls within the
grasp of the FOIA,70 and, as such, individuals can use the FOIA to gain
access to records held by the FDA, including clinical trial data.71

A. The Balance Impaired
¶16
However, when Congress enacted the FOIA, it realized “that
legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of
certain types of information and provided nine specific exemptions under
which disclosure could be refused.”72 Specifically, Exemption 4 permits
nondisclosure of agency records if such records contain “commercial or
financial information [that was] obtained from a person [and is] privileged
or confidential.”73 Clinical trial data qualify as commercial information
under this exemption and will be withheld if they are deemed confidential;
that is, if disclosure would “cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.”74 This
competitive harm is established when both actual competition and the
likelihood of substantial competitive injury are shown.75 In carrying out
this determination of confidentiality, courts must perform a “rough
balancing” of the public interest in disclosure against the private interests in
continued confidentiality, a balancing that plays a central role in whether
the records should be withheld under Exemption 4.76

67

Anderson, 907 F.2d at 941 (quoting MRO v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437
U.S. 214, 242 (1978)).
68
Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d
252, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 671 F.2d 553, 556
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam)).
69
Anderson, 907 F.2d at 941.
70
R&D Labs. Inc. v. FDA, No. 00-cv-0165, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20209, at
*14 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2000).
71
See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1282 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter HRG 1983].
72
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 904 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982)) [hereinafter HRG
1999].
73
Id. at 903 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)).
74
HRG 1983, 704 F.2d at 1290-91 (quoting Nat’l Parks & Conservation Assoc.
v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
75
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 964 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
76
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d
37, 45 (D.D.C. 2002).
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It is the courts’ exceedingly narrow construction of the public
interest, contrary to the clear policy of disclosure mandated by the FOIA,
that has upset the balance under Exemption 4 and barred the public from its
rightful access to information held by the government, including clinical
trial data. This narrow construction has its roots in the 1989 Supreme Court
decision U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press,77 which involved the disclosure of FBI rap sheets on an
individual who was connected to the mob and whose company had received
several federal defense contracts.78 The FBI sought to withhold the
documents under Exemption 7(C), which authorizes the withholding of
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such [materials] . . . could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”79 In
ruling against disclosure, the Court enunciated what has become known as
the “central purpose” doctrine.80 The doctrine holds that “the FOIA’s
central purpose is to ensure that the Government’s activities be opened to
the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens
that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.”81
If the documents sought under the FOIA do not “directly reveal
governmental operations or performance,” they will not be disclosed
because they fall “outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was
enacted to serve.”82
¶17

The Court, however, went further by refusing to consider any other
interest that does not reveal, “what the [] government is up to,”83 stating that
“whether disclosure of a private document . . . is warranted must turn on the
nature of the requested document and its relationship to ‘the basic purpose
of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny’ . . . rather than on the particular purpose for which the
document is being requested.”84 This “derivative use” limitation85 implies
that the only public interest to be weighed under the FOIA is that embodied
in the central purpose doctrine, and all other purposes, no matter how
substantial they might be, are irrelevant.
¶18

77

489 U.S. 749 (1989) [hereinafter Reporters Committee].
Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned:
Lower Court Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose”
Reformation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 983, 988 (2002).
79
Andrussier, supra note 66, at 755 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c) (1988)).
80
Christopher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public
Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1255 (1996).
81
Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 774.
82
Id. at 774-75.
83
HRG 1999, 185 F.3d at 904 (quoting Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773).
84
Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772.
85
See Beall, supra note 80, at 1259-60.
78
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The enormity of the impact of the central purpose doctrine and the
derivative use limitation on the public’s right of access to clinical trial data
under the FOIA is illustrated in Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
FDA.86 In this case, the plaintiffs sought both preclinical and clinical
studies for all drug applications that had been discontinued due to death or
serious injury of patients or due to safety concerns arising from preclinical
studies.87 In reversing the order for release of the information, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that the
plaintiff’s desire to “review whether the FDA is adequately safeguarding the
health of people who participate in drug trials” satisfied the central purpose
doctrine because it directly revealed “what the [] government is up to.” 88
However, the court firmly rejected the public interest in preventing “other
drug companies from repeating [the drug sponsor’s] mistakes, thereby
avoiding risk to human health”89 as an improper derivative use, stating that
“[i]t is not open to [the plaintiff] . . . to bolster the case for disclosure by
claiming an additional public benefit . . . [t]hat is not related to ‘what the []
government is up to.’”90 As the dissent soberly pointed out, “[t]his means
that even if disclosure were the only way to prevent the loss of human life,
that would count for nothing as against a showing . . . [of] substantial harm
to [the drug sponsor’s] competitive position.”91
¶19

B. Restoring the Balance
¶20
In light of both the loss of human life that occurred because the
public did not have access to antidepressant clinical trials and the threat of
complete disclosure without regard to the competitive harm that drug
sponsors could suffer, the limitations placed on the public interest should be
abandoned. The broad construction of Exemption 4 that the courts have
adopted is contrary to the FOIA’s clear policy of disclosure92 and the
narrow construction that should be applied to its exemptions.93 Justice
Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, has declared that the plain language of
the FOIA does not support the central purpose doctrine, which in fact

86

185 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Symposium, Life Sciences,
Technology, and the Law, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 175, 232-33
(2003) (discussing the classification of adverse event reports under the FOIA).
87
HRG 1999, 185 F.3d at 901.
88
Id. at 904 (quoting Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773).
89
Id. at 903.
90
Id. at 904.
91
Id. at 908 (Garland J., dissenting).
92
Andrussier, supra note 66, at 753-55; see Halstuk, supra note 78, at 994
(quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
93
Anderson, 907 F.2d at 941.
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“changed the FOIA calculus” against disclosure.94 Indeed, the underlying
purpose of the FOIA’s broad disclosure policy was “to remedy gaping
loopholes in the FOIA’s predecessor, the public disclosure section of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.” 95 This predecessor was so weak in
its mandate for disclosure, with such malleable language as exempting from
disclosure “any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public
interest,” that it “came to be regarded by agencies as a tool to withhold
information.”96 Similarly, the limitations placed on the public interest have
twisted the FOIA exemptions into the tools of government agencies to
exclude from disclosure far more than was meant to be.97
In removing the judicially imposed limitations on Exemption 4,
Congress should take heart in the fact that such action has been supported
by its members in the past. Senator Leahy wrote in a report for the
Electronic Freedom of Information Act, enacted in October 1996, that
“[e]fforts by the courts to articulate a ‘central purpose’ for which
information should be released imposes a limitation on the FOIA which
Congress did not intend and which cannot be found in its language, and
distorts the broader import of the Act in effectuating Government
openness.”98
¶21

Furthermore, even if these limitations on the public interest are
valid, they should only be applied to the FOIA’s privacy exemptions,
Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Because these exemptions invoke individuals’
right to privacy, broader construction may be warranted. Indeed, in
enunciating the central purpose doctrine, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the FOIA was not meant “to require the government to be a central
depository of information about private citizens, accessible at the request of
any person for any reason.”99 The desire to provide heightened protection
for information implicating an individual’s right to privacy is particularly
clear in Exemption 7(C), the language of which was gradually broadened
from “would . . . constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” to
“could be reasonably be expected to.”100 In addition, the Supreme Court’s
¶22

94

Halstuk, supra note 78, at 1017 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Defense v. Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 509 (1994)); Beall, supra note 80, at 1261
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 114 S. Ct. 1006,
1017 (1994)).
95
Halstuk, supra note 78, at 993; Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at754-55; see
5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
96
Halstuk, supra note 78, at 993 (quoting E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79
(1973)).
97
Id. at 995-96.
98
Id. at 1016 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-272, at 26-27).
99
Andrussier, supra note 66, at 766 (emphasis added).
100
Id. at 762.
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rendering of the “central purpose” doctrine was inextricably connected to
whether disclosure was “warranted,”101 a term that appears only in these
two exemptions.

CONCLUSION
¶23
By removing the judicially imposed limitations on Exemption 4,
interests both for and against disclosure could be given their proper weight
in determining whether clinical trial data should be released to the public.
Of course, the public’s interest in monitoring the FDA’s administration of
the drug development process and ensuring that the agency is fulfilling its
statutory charge of protecting the public from dangerous drugs remains on
the balance in support of disclosure. In addition to this interest in
discovering “what the government is up to,” the public’s own interest in
protecting human health and ensuring that physicians and their patients have
as much information as possible to make informed choices about medical
treatment weigh in favor of disclosure. In situations such as that with
antidepressant use in children, where anecdotal evidence of serious side
effects existed virtually since the drugs were introduced to the market, these
factors tip the balance in favor of disclosure. In this way, both the needs of
medicine and those of the drug industry can be accommodated.

101

Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772.

